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Abstract—Data Distribution Service (DDS) is a realtime peer-
to-peer protocol that serves as a scalable middleware between
distributed networked systems found in many Industrial IoT do-
mains such as automotive, medical, energy, and defense. Since the
initial ratification of the standard, specifications have introduced
a Security Model and Service Plugin Interface (SPI) architecture,
facilitating authenticated encryption and data centric access
control while preserving interoperable data exchange. However,
as Secure DDS v1.1, the default plugin specifications presently
exchanges digitally signed capability lists of both participants in
the clear during the crypto handshake for permission attestation;
thus breaching confidentiality of the context of the connection.
In this work, we present an attacker model that makes use
of network reconnaissance afforded by this leaked context in
conjunction with formal verification and model checking to
arbitrarily reason about the underlying topology and reachability
of information flow, enabling targeted attacks such as selective
denial of service, adversarial partitioning of the data bus, or
vulnerability excavation of vendor implementations.
Index Terms—Data Distribution Service, IoT Protocol, Secu-
rity, Network Reconnaissance, Formal Verification
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of connected and autonomous devices defined
as Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT), has
uncovered how the limited resources and the weak security
design choices that have been made in the past represent
a source of concerns in terms of safety and security in
deployment. To address those problems we can distinguish
between two lines of research, either studying the security
and hardening solutions for the devices or focusing on the
communication infrastructures.
This work regards the latter; in particular we discuss Data
Distribution Service (DDS) [1] from the Object Management
Group (OMG), a widely used1 real-time middleware com-
munication mechanism based on a publish-subscribe model.
This standard, used in several industries including Automo-
tive, Transportation, Healthcare, Energy systems, Aerospace,
Defense, etc., permits one to build large scaled distributed
networks without relying on a centralized server. However,
such applications require a rigid security mechanism since
any potential vulnerability can possibly lead to millions in
economic losses or damages. In order to cope with requests, a
design for Secure DDS Plugins [2] has been developed. This
1https://omgwiki.org/dds/who-is-using-dds-2
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Fig. 1: An example scenario where a external observer wishes
to internally analyze either a closed off device or an external
restricted network by monitoring traffic between observable
systems. Such an adversary may be excavating for vulnerabil-
ities, attempting to recover a system’s hidden state or internal
connectivity, beyond what IP packet sniffing may merely infer.
enhanced version of the original DDS protocol adds authen-
tication, access control, domain protection and cryptographic
support to the standard.
In further detail, the security model adopted is meant to
provide: confidentiality of the data samples, data and messages
integrity, authentication and authorization of DDS writers
and readers, message-origin and data-origin authentication,
and optionally non-repudiation. By enforcing those proper-
ties, threats such as unauthorized subscriber and publisher
creation, tampering and replay messages, and unauthorized
access to data, are blocked. Nevertheless, the proposed threat
model doesn’t cover permission confidentiality 2. In fact,
by analyzing the plugin, we may observe how participant’
handshakes are performed by exchanging a plain text per-
mission file. Although digitally signed to preserve integrity
and block an unauthorized node from accessing resources
via forged permissions, its transmission plain text voids its
confidentiality. Permission files define a node’s capability to
read and or write data in a certain domain on the databus. By
leaking such information, an attacker can infer the application
layer topology by comparing the capabilities of each domain
participant and deducing possible connections without having
2https://issues.omg.org/issues/DDSSEC12-13
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to decrypt ciphered message data. A case example, where the
topic names themselves may remain sensitive, could include
when a topic offers some clue as to the amount of confidential
resource. If any topics are indexed sequentially, attackers can
use a classical statistical theory of estimation, similar to that
applied during WW2 to solve the ’German tank problem’
[3]; e.g. for estimating the number of surveillance sensors or
alarms armed in a network or in a physical subsystem.
Additional uses for associating topics between participants
is that of system identification. Higher level frameworks
relying on DDS, such as the second generation Robotic
Operating System (ROS2)3 often make use of standardized
naming conventions, such as including the software package
name or data type in the topic namespaces advertised. Fin-
gerprinting via these clear text traits can assist in recognizing
un-patched or exploitable versions of software/firmware. For
example, navigation software stack or device drivers fre-
quently include topics such as /navigation/obstacle range or
/bumblebee2/left/image raw. Thus the significance or internal
function of networked devices as with automotive ECUs or
robotic sensors may remain transparent to unauthorized users,
regardless of whether or not DDS Security is enabled.
Unlike traditional network reconnaissance methods like us-
ing traceroute in which an attacker needs to query the network
repeatedly to obtain information about the topology [4], that
may trigger alarms to network administrators, the methods we
present allow an attacker to construct a richer topology of the
underlying data bus merely by passively sniffing the packets
inside the network. As per the traditional case, administrators
can employ techniques that obscure the network itself [5] to
impede an attacker from reconstructing the true network topol-
ogy, or that trigger intrusion detection countermeasures before
an actual attack is executed. In a passive attack scenario, it
becomes substantially harder to identify an attacker before any
malicious operation is performed. Therefore, we investigate
how revealing the data flow semantics for each node and its
functional role in the network renders DDS networks more
vulnerable when facing malicious adversaries.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: Section II
provides an overview and technical description of the secure
DDS protocol and related components incorporated into our
approach; Section III details our threat and attack model
assumptions; Section IV details our approach in partially
reconstructing data bus topology and inferring reachability
throughout the network at scale; Section V documents our ex-
perimental setup and testing infrastructure; Section VI demon-
strates how an attacker may isolate information flow from a
single node by identifying critical targets or verify reachability
from a selected source to target destination; Section VII
discusses related work in relation to network reconnaissance,
DDS networking and information flow control; Section VIII
summarizes our main contributions and discusses potential
mitigations and their caveats, as well as future work addressing
remaining issues in remote access control attestation.
3https://index.ros.org/doc/ros2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Data Distribution Service
The Data Distribution Service (DDS) [1] is a standardized
network middleware protocol that aims to provide reliable
and scalable service based on a publish-subscribe model, i.e.
a data centric model based on a conceptual Global Data
Space. The decoupled nature of publisher-subscriber compared
to an ordinary request-response model renders the protocol
more suitable for real-time systems and IoT applications.
Applications can choose to have publishers and/or subscribers,
where the data model underlying the Global Data Space, or
a DDS Domain, is a set of data objects. A Publisher is an
object responsible for data distribution and may publish data
of different data types. Similarly, a Subscriber is an object
responsible for receiving published data and making it avail-
able for the receiving application. These DomainParticipants
can respectively write or read in a Domain, which denotes
the set of all applications that can communicate with each
other. Topic objects conceptually fit between publications and
subscriptions, and uniquely identify the name, data type and
corresponding Quality of Service (QoS) associated with the
data on both the publisher and the subscriber sides.
B. Authentication
Each DomainParticipant must be authenticated prior to
joining the DDS domain. On start, a DomainParticipant au-
thenticates its local identity to others in the network using its
own public certificate. This Identity Certificate is signed by the
Identity Certificate Authority (CA) [2]. Each DomainPartici-
pant will then verify the authentication of a discovered remote
peer through a mutual handshake request and reply messages.
Among other tokens inside the handshake request, the Identity
Certificate and the Domain Participant Permissions (detailed
in next section) of a remote peer will also be included; this is
precisely the information leakage we exploit in this work.
C. Access Control
In order to ensure authorization of DDS publishers and
subscribers, DDS defines an Access Control Plugin. The Do-
mainParticipant must be provisioned access to given domains,
publish access to topics for data it produces, and subscribe
access to topics for data it consumes. In addition, there are
more configurable permissions that further segment data ac-
cess, such as DDS partitions, data tags, and domain tags, that
are omitted from our discussion for brevity but are accounted
for in our approach. Three configuration documents are as-
sociated with the Access Control Service: a Permissions CA
Certificate, a Domain Governance signed by Permission CA,
and a Domain Participant Permission signed by the Permission
CA. The Domain Governance is a XML document specifying
the protection policy inside this domain, including whether or
not to enforce encryption, whether to set specific limitations
on certain topics, etc. The Domain Participant Permission is
a XML document containing the permissions of a Domain-
Participant. Essentially, it is a set of grants that denotes the
rules to either reject or allow the DomainParticipant to write
or access certain topics, inside certain partitions of a domain,
with certain data tags associated with the DomainParticipant.
It also includes the domain the DomainParticipant allowed is
to communicate in, and the time period that such permissions
may be valid [2].
D. Imandra
Imandra4 is a formal verification tool, originally purposed
for model checking financial market software and exchange
protocols [6]. It is highly adaptable and performs the nonlinear
arithmetic, automated induction, etc. that we need to infer the
proofs or counterexamples to resolve out SAT formulation of
permission intersections. Formal verification techniques can
reason about a large state space without exhaustive search.
Still, when surveying DDS networks at scale, solving such
SAT queries would remain a bottleneck, and thus should be
optimized for by reducing the number of queries required
when inferring about the network. Using Imandra, we simplify
the implementation of our approach by replicating the DDS
Security SPI specification as functional programs in OCaml,
to faithfully model default plugin logic. This also allows for
generalizing our automated attack pipeline for non-default
plugins; merely update the OCaml model to reflect a new SAT.
III. THREAT
In this section, we specify both the threat and attacker mod-
els, including assumptions made when applying our approach.
A. Threat Model
In addition to information disclosure of permissions dis-
cussed, our threat model considers the following:
• Network traffic may be sniffed, via live or recorded.
• Network topology may be originally unknown.
• Network semantics may be originally unknown.
• Network topology may be non-static.
• Certificate Authorities remain un-compromised.
• Participant issued certificates remain un-compromised.
• Attackers may selectively disrupt network connectivity
by dropping packet traffic, route poisoning, or physically
disrupting a participant device, for some non-free cost.
B. Attack Model
For the attack model, minimum requirements for execu-
tion necessitate some access to network level DDS traffic.
For applications such as distributed IoT systems, a strong
assumption would be that of an attacker owning all of the
victim’s networks simultaneously. However, neither complete
nor simultaneous network access are among these minimum
requirements for passive or active attacks, given that our later
approach inherently reconciles with partial observability over
connectivity and time. Thus multi-site measurements, such as
recording IP traffic over different connections one at a time,
is sufficient for reconnaissance purposes.
One may argue that access to DDS network traffic itself as
a rather strong assumption for an attack scenario, given that
4https://www.imandra.ai
enterprise networks often operate through VPNs. However, as
DDS is a decentralized protocol supporting a range of QoS and
security features, applications necessitating its adoption, often
demand p2p connectivity over lossy channels that are band-
width and energy limited. Centralized protocols dependent
on reliable transport that add additional crypto overhead and
deadline latency are subsequently ill-suited for these scenarios.
Thus for applications using DDS, the assumption that Secure
DDS traffic is observable over the physical network layer is
probable, if not most likely for internal system networks, such
as inside autonomous vehicles.
A representative IoT example of a highly distributed, re-
altime, peer-to-peer network would be the Cooperative In-
telligent Transport Systems (C-ITS)5 under development of
the European Commission, whose goal is to build a smart-
city scaled network to exchange realtime data among vehicles
and other road infrastructural facilities to optimize traffic
management and take full advantage of highly automated
vehicles (level 4/5) [7].
We decompose the attack into two phases based on whether
the attacker has the additional ability to control the network. If
the attacker can only observe the network then it can perform
passive attacks; on the other hand, if it has some degree
of influence on the network, active realtime attacks become
feasible.
Starting from a passive prospective, capturing permission
tokens from sniffed DDS security handshake traffic enables an
attacker to gradually reconstruct the underlying computation
graph. In addition to mapping the structure of the computation
graph to physical network topology, reconstruction of the data
flow and semantic connectivity is also obtained; e.g. how
devices/participants interact with each other over specific data
objects.
Progressing to the active prospective, having reconstructed
a rich model of system connectivity, plus some level of control
over the network, an attacker is thus situated to execute
far more targeted and specialized attacks. For example, if a
targeted participant is directly inaccessible due to hardware
protections, an active attacker may still selectively isolate it
from certain data objects in the rest of the DDS domain by
dropping network traffic identified as pertaining to a given
topic, e.g IP port/address routes inferred from the secure
handshake. In this way, an attacker may effectively remove
the target participant from parts of the DDS domain, cutting
the information flow from the network, or vice versa, while
without overly disrupting the connectivity to the rest of the
physical network, or physically compromising the host hard-
ware.
Even if an attacker does not have the capability to control
the traffic, as with secure wireless scenarios, an attacker could
revert to less covert methods such as jamming the local
spectrum or tampering the physical device. These methods
come at significantly greater cost for the attacker, and thus
the expected Return on Investment (RoI) must justify the
5https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its en
additional risk. Again, relying on the rich model of system
connectivity, an attacker may better prioritized a partial attack
surface, e.g. only damaging infrastructures know to host a
targeted resource or data object type for the rest of the domain.
IV. APPROACH
Under the assumptions discussed in the previous section, we
know that once an attacker acquires the handshake packets it
can construct the semantic network topology by interpreting
the permission files. The sample snippets with Fig 7 in the
appendix depict the example permission files that we will
use to illustrate this process. After obtaining the network
topology, we also explore how an attacker may formulate
queries regarding the network’s connectivity.
Example queries include: 1) Given the set of nodes (i.e.
DDS participants) A and B in the cyclic graph G, what
minimal set nodes in G, exclusive of A and B, would need
to be disrupted to discontinue information flow from A to B;
2) Given a source A, what are the nodes that we need to
offline in order to isolate all information flow from set A; 3)
Given a destination set B, what set of nodes would need to
be compromised to prevent B from only receiving information
from the rest of G. With this information, an attacker may then
selectively partition any node from the rest of the network with
minimal invested effort or detectable network disturbance.
A. Network Topology
We depict the network topology as a directed graph with
vertices representing nodes in the network, and edges indicat-
ing that there exists at least one topic match between the two
connected vertices. The primary reason for a directed graph
is that we need to distinguish publish and subscribe actions,
which can naturally be described using directional edges, with
edges pointing from a publisher to a subscriber. Additionally,
to account for a third ‘relay’ permission type, we decompose
all relay actions to a combination of subscribe and publish
capabilities on the topic. This reduction not only decreases
the complexity of inferring information flow but also eases
the graph visualization and introspection.
B. Heuristic Graph and Lazy Evaluation
In real world applications, a network may consist of hun-
dreds or even thousands of nodes. Such tremendous scales
inevitably make any graph construction or influencing a re-
source an intensive task. A naive approach to constructing a
network topology requires the consideration of all permission
files when computing for the potential intersect in respective
permission grants. However, this is impractical given an ex-
haustive O(n(n−1)/2) would be done using our formal veri-
fication of grant intersections; this is among the most compu-
tationally intensive steps in our attacker pipeline. Instead, our
approach reduces query time latency via admissible heuristics
and lazy evaluation. By first generating a heuristic graph to
approximate the information flow, we substantially curtail the
number of expensive inferences on grant intersections. Thus,
while the initial model may exaggerate apparent connectivity,
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Fig. 2: Raw Graph Obtained by Scanning Permission Files
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Fig. 3: Connected Graph Obtained by Connecting Topics
we can remain assured that resulting reachability queries via
formal verification remain complete.
Generating a heuristic graph mostly relies on the fast and
admissible approximation as to whether or not to connect
two vertices. We decompose this approximation process into
three phases: 1) First, a simple directed graph is created by
indexing each grant in the permission files, adding respective
vertices for both nodes as well as topics to the graph without
duplicates, and then connecting nodes and topics according to
the direction of information flow. This results in a directed
bipartite graph such that vertex set U consists of all nodes in
the network and vertex set V includes all topics involved in the
network. Figure 2 shows a sample graph on a simple network
with a talker and a listener. In this simple network, vertex set
U consists of nodes talker and listener, whereas vertex set V
is comprised of four topics.
CN=talker
foo/bar/*, foo/bar/pudding, foo/bar/test
CN=listener
foo/baz/test
(a) Contracted G
CN=talker
CN=listener
(b) Heuristic G
Fig. 4: Contracted Graph is obtained by collapsing related
topics into single node, while the Heuristic Graph then is
obtained by collapsing topic vertices.
This graph is quick to generate as nodes as well as topics
can be iteratively appended on the fly, rather than holistically
batching the entire graph all at once and performing inter-
section checks between any two nodes’ publish and subscribe
topic expressions.
2) The second phase focuses on combining related topics
to form connected components of topics and then collapses
the topics into a single vertex. By combining related topics,
we mean drawing bidirectional edges between any two topics
that match at least once using two way ‘fnmatch’: the POSIX
string matching function chosen in the Secure DDS standard.
An example of this is in Figure 3, where we have one
such connected component formed by three topics including
foo/bar/pudding, foo/bar/*, and foo/bar/test. The transition
from Figure 3 to Figure 4a illustrates the process of collapsing
the connected components into a single vertex. Although this
process is simple, it may potentially increase the total number
of paths between different nodes in the network. The extra
paths we get do not exist in the real network topology, hence
a heuristic graph instead of an exact model.
3) During the last phase, we further reduce the bipartite
graph to a regular network topology by eliminating topics
vertex set and connect nodes that might have the capabilities
to communicate on some topic. In our simple example, we
get Figure 4b as a heuristic graph after completing this step,
which serves as a foundation to answer the connectivity query.
Given the retrieving of a heuristic graph, naive queries
on reachability using the simple edge traversal would be
inaccurate; our approach resolves this via lazy evaluation.
First, using the naive path computed on the heuristic graph, i.e.
using Dijkstra Algorithm or A*, the resulting edge sequence or
node pairs are iteratively verified for directional connectivity
using a satisfaction constraint solver. We describe the reach-
ability verification process in detail under section IV-C. By
pruning paths and edges sequences at query time, we avoid
unnecessarily checking unfeasible flows derived from topic
permission mismatches.
C. Reachability Verification
During the handshake phase, two DDS DomainParticipants
will each verify that the other has the permission to access the
resource in question. For the subject node that is advertising
its access, we will abstract this into a subject representation;
containing the information about the name of the subject, the
action it is requesting, the topics that it advertises to publish
or subscribe, and other subject criteria regulated by access
control. Algorithm 1 in the index details how each node will
validate the provided subject representation with the subject’s
respective permission file, and return a qualifier: ALLOW or
DENY of the request.
The access control algorithm checks the grant in the permis-
sions file that matches the supplied subject and is valid at the
time it is evaluated. For this grant, it sequentially enumerates
through all the rules in order, and returns immediately if there
is a match between the rule and the subject. The matching is
conditioned upon many criterias including topics, partitions
and data tags. If no rule is matched, the returned qualifier
falls through to the grant’s default behavior.
To check for permissive exchanges between grants and de-
termine whether data flow between given nodes is possible, we
must formally verify the intersection of the two permissions
files; i.e. either assert or refute the existence of a pair of
matching subjects that satisfy all pairwise constraints. More
precisely, given two nodes A and B, and their corresponding
permission files PermA and PermB, find two subject actions
ActA and ActB such that all the following hold:
Evaluate(PermA,ActA) = ALLOW (1)
Evaluate(PermB,ActB) = ALLOW (2)
Match(ActA,ActB) or Match(ActA,ActB) (3)
The constraints above dictate that both subject instances
must conform to the respective permissions, while the QoS
attributes of both subjects such as topic, partition, and data
tags must also correspond. The following section details the
construction and consumption of such constraints.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To validate our approach, we construct an experimental
setup with a reproducible test harness as a pipeline for the
entire attacker model6. Docker is used to containerize three
main processes, as well as virtualize a targeted Secure DDS
deployment, as shown in Fig 5.
We first programmatically synthesize a DDS application
with minimal spanning permissions, valid PKI and CA trust
anchors, where the digitally signed governance enforces au-
thenticated encryption for all transport. This experimental
configuration is then provided to an isolated simulation control
that launches each participant in separate containers within a
controlled software defined network. The first few seconds of
network traffic is consecutively recorded to capture initial Real
Time Publish Subscribe (RTPS) protocol discovery data, and
then given to the attacker.
The attacker process strips all permission tokens for the
raw packet capture and constructs a graph based database of
permission tokens and respective origin/destination IP address.
This database is then shared with the SAT solver to compute
client queries.
For formal verification, we utilize Imandra as our selected
SAT solver by replicating the access control evaluation logic as
defined by the DDS specification in OCaml, a strongly typed
functional programming language supported with Imandra.
This allows us to quickly prototype and experiment with
alternate security plugin designs with minimal modification.
The model of the access control logic and accompanying
token database is used by the Imandra service to solve for
incremental reachability inquiries from the inquisitive attacker.
The attacker uses the proved or refuted subject instances
as feedback to prune the heuristic graph until the overall
reachability inquiry is determined.
6https://github.com/ruffsl/dds security sniffer
DDS
Model
XML
tokens
DDS
Perms
Siff 
Capt.
publisher
publisher &
subscriber
subscriber
Imandra
Server
Recon 
Attacker
Simulation 
Controller
Fig. 5: Visual of experimental setup and test harness. Network
discovery traffic between Secure DDS participants is captured
and used in concert with the SAT solver to infer application
topology from intersecting permissions. The attacker then uses
this feedback to precisely influence the information flow.
Armed with the associative model of DDS objects to physi-
cal network address, the attacker may finally sabotage the tar-
get application by selectively deteriorating DDS connections
by commanding the simulation controller to drop specified
containers from the software defined network.
To observe this disturbance, our simulated DDS network is
simply composed of broadcast nodes that periodically publish
a KeepAlive diagnostic message to all topics they can publish.
Each node also serves as repeater, relaying any subscribed
KeepAlive messages to all topics it can publish after appending
its own id to avoid cyclic packets. By sampling the packet
lineage from different points in the distributed application, unit
tests for bisecting information flow can be verified. In the
following section an illustrative example of this is presented.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we showcase some example scenarios to
elucidate our work and demonstrate the correctness of our
implementation on a more complex network; a 2D grid of
consisting of 36 nodes is used to maintain readability.
A. Source and Target
If both source node and target node are specified, our model
outputs a list of nodes as the path from source to target. For
example, in the first subfigure of Figure 6a, if the source node
is (5, 0), and the target node is (0, 3), then the model outputs
a list of nodes containing all the green nodes.
B. Source Only
Given only a source node, our model displays a minimal set
of nodes that an attacker needs to take down to prevent the
source from passing data to all its subscribers. As shown in
the second subfigure of Figure 6b, the source node is colored
in blue, and the possible target nodes are colored in green.
If the input is the blue node, then the model outputs a set
including the three green nodes.
C. Target Only
Similarly, if only a target node is given, we will obtain a
minimal set of nodes an attacker needs to attack to prevent the
target from acquiring any new information from the network.
This is illustrated in the third subfigure of Figure 6c, where the
target node is colored in green and its source node is colored
in blue.
D. Nonconforming Software
Over the course of development, two notable vulnerabilities
in existing DDS software where discovered while validating
our default security plugin models as compared to the OMG
specification verses widely used vendor implementations.
Firstly, the checking of partition permissions from remote
participant connections was found to been omitted from the
Policy Decision Point in the access control plugin 7. This
departure in compliance results in unintended declassification
of topic data to remote participants who lack the proper
authorization for participating within the same secure DDS
partition.
Secondly, improper use of topic expression matching was
also found in the same vendor implementation8. By naively
swapping arguments for the query and pattern string in the
fnmatch call-sites, this allows any two participants to establish
a connection using topic names with embedded expressions
that match onto topic expressions lists within the permission
document. This discrepancy from the specification was first
observed and subsequently verified during the aforementioned
experiments.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Network Reconnaissance
We have demonstrated that the permission files in clear
text leak application layer topology to anyone in the same
network. In fact, the encrypted packets can still leak topology
information to an attacker. Other techniques are needed for
us to fully defend against network reconnaissance. McClure
et al. [4] presented how tools like traceroute can be used to
construct the internet layer topology. An attacker may use the
topology information to find the weak links in the network
and DDoS attack the weakest link. To thwart reconnaissance
via traceroute, Meier et al. [5] proposed to limit the ICMP
traffic in the network or obfuscate the traceroute result. The
other problem is that IoT devices usually connect wirelessly,
which allows an insider attacker to eavesdrop on a large
chunk of the network. If the chunk is too large, an insider
attacker would be able to rebuild the application layer topology
by merely examining the flow of traffic. Hakiri et al. [8]
proposed to connect the IoT devices with wired software
defined networks using OpenFlow. Wired connections may
7https://github.com/eProsima/Fast-RTPS/issues/443
8https://github.com/eProsima/Fast-RTPS/issues/441
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Fig. 6: Left to right. Query 1: given source and destination, prove data dependency. Query 2: given source, determine minimum
set of nodes to isolate incoming data. Query 3: given target, determine the minimum set of nodes to cut off outgoing data.
limit the scope of possible eavesdropping and also the dynamic
flexible internet layer topology nullifies the reconnaissance
attempts via traceroute.
B. Flow Control
Secure DDS uses topic and partition match to enforce the
flow control policy. The topic and partition expressions support
fnmatch, allowing developers to build a flexible trust model.
Secure DDS’s label scheme is similar to the DStar labels [9]
for single topic and partition but secure DDS assumes every
node has the privileges to downgrade data it owns. The flow
is possible as long as the subscribe set and publish set have
an intersection, instead of a publish set needing to be a subset
of the subscribe set. The policy opens probability not only for
bad configuration but also for covert channels and allows an
inside attacker to leak sensitive data. Therefore, the current
flow control model works only if nodes that are granted a
certificate by CA can be entirely trusted.
C. DDS
White et al. [10] present a framework that procedurally pro-
visions access control policies for distributed middleware. Our
work extends this by adding more reachability verification on
fnmatch expression to ensure that no covert channels exist in
candidate policies. Khaefi et al. [11], [12] presented how using
a bloom filter in DDS node discovery phase could significantly
reduce the payload of handshake traffic at the expense of a
tiny chance of collision. Encoding topic discovery data into
a bloom filter indeed obscures the topic expressions while
providing some probabilistic integrity of the topic permissions.
However, given probabilistic data structures are subject to
collisions, e.g. false-positive set matches, it remains unsuitable
for access control policy enforcement.
D. Formal Verification for XACML
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
has become an attractive standard for the specification of Ac-
cess Control policies given the prevalence of existing XACML
tools, human and machine readable syntax, and rich set of con-
structs. However these same features can also make authoring
XAMCL policies prone to human error. Turkmen et al. [13]
present a formal analysis of XACML policies by encoding
them into Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) formulas,
facilitating formal policy analysis while relieving authors of
the burden of manually proving soundness gradually. While
this work remains more general in terms of access control
definitions, our work additionally affords soundness checks
for provisioned permissions in addition to the Policy Decision
Point (PDP) logic, given that XACML is applicable to profile
definitions, yet not for provisioning such profile to identities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work we introduced an approach for conducting
passive network reconnaissance on systems relying upon Se-
cure DDS, ascertaining a partial topological model of the
underlying data bus, and associative mapping between data
objects to network addressable participants. Using formal
verification and model checking, we can then inquire about
directed reachability through the distributed computation graph
to efficiently perform vulnerability excavation offline without
ever actively engaging with the targeted system. We then
demonstrate how such acquired system models may then be
used by an active attacker to prioritize targeted participants
based on the data objects they represent or the connectivity
they facilitate in the larger picture of the system, either by
selectively isolating data flow to or from a given data pro-
ducer/consumer without directly disturbing other participants.
Furthermore, our methods for formal verification have been
used to prove two notable vulnerabilities in existing Secure
DDS vendor implementations.
Although the reconnaissance methods and vulnerability
excavation tooling developed over the course of our approach
may inevitably prove to be of use to malicious actors, they
are also immediately beneficial for general system validation
and penetration testing, as when auditing mission critical
systems for flaws in access control design or implementation.
For example, when certifying interface isolation between the
multimedia and drive-by-wire subsystems in an autonomous
automotive, manufacturers may be required to formally prove
or refute the set of all satisfiable data channels between the two
that would be admissible by the factory permission policy, and
assure that no satisfiable channels (covert or otherwise) exist
outside of the anticipated set.
The approach presented predominantly makes use of the
current Secure DDS default plugin standard, thus resolving
this issue would largely serve to mitigate the feasibility of
the attacks demonstrated. Specifically, exchanging permission
tokens in the clear during the initial crypto handshake, thus
breaching confidentiality of the context of the connection is
perhaps the focal issue at present. Revising the integration
between the crypto and access control plugins to alternatively
postponing permission token exchange through a secure chan-
nel after the crypto handshake has concluded is perhaps the
most straightforward improvement. This may subsequently add
another round trip delay to the overhead introduced in securing
connections; however, granted the crypto handshake does not
include the action request or response to begin with, it stands
to reason that the permission token could be appended to the
payload of the subsequent secured requests or responses.
Alternatively, one could seek to obscure the permissions
embedded in the token by using an HMAC with a known key,
either embedded in the token or distributing it out of band.
Each topic/partition/data-tag element in the XML permission
document could be replaced with say the base64 encoded
digest of the expression string it replaces. Thus, upon receiving
a action request from a remote participant, the local participant
merely applies the same HMAC to the action and searches
for the matching digests in the remote permission list. This
has the benefit of obscuring permissions from those sniffing
handshake network traffic while making minimal changes
to existing vendor libraries. In Fast RTPS for example, the
above obfuscation is implementable in less than 60 additional
lines using OpenSSL. Although this works for basic string
matching, support expression expansion remains an issue given
the expressions in the permission list are just as obscured from
the interned recipient.
However, both of these mitigations thus far, either postpon-
ing permission exchange or obfuscating the fields in the per-
mission token have their potential drawbacks. Using HMAC is
particularly vulnerable as message authentication codes only
really afford integrity and not confidentiality, i.e. once an
attacker knows what they are looking for, it can easily ascertain
whether the permission it seeks is present in the token. Given
that systems that build upon DDS, like ROS2, commonly use
predictably or standardized topic names, it may be trivial to
brute force obscured permissions from a limited corpus of
topic names, or correlate matching digests across tokens to
infer connectivity.
In postponing permission exchange, we merely delay the
invocation of the Policy Decision Point, affording a secure
channel to remote participants whose privileges we have
not yet attested to. Only a single trusted identity need be
compromised to begin scraping the permission tokens of
others in the same secure distributed network. While DDS
discovery information could also be decrypted with the same
compromised participant identity, the permission tokens that
divulge what data a participant can access versus what they
currently advertise can still be advantageous to an attacker as
described previously.
IX. FUTURE WORK
A wider issue facing traditional attestation of remote privi-
leges using digitally signed tokens is that the entire token must
first be revealed in order to verify the trusted signature locally,
effectively divulging all of the remote agents’ capabilities,
be they applicable to the current session or not. An ideal
attestation method would allow a participant to prove its
required privileges needed for the action at hand; nothing
more, nothing less.
An alternative approach could be to fracture the token into
multiple sub-tokens that are individually verifiable and only
encompass a single permission. As discussed by Caiazza el
al. [14], the remote agent could then pick and choose the
minimal required set of sub-tokens to be shared to gain access.
This potentially adds to the complexity of the CA provisioning
and expiration of permissions, as well as the coordination of
exchange tokens during runtime.
This sub-token scheme would not however ultimately pre-
vent divulging the scope of privilege for a single permission,
as in the case when the permission is not just a string, but
also an expression, such as a matching prefix rule for all topics
starting with /foo/∗ revealing that the remote participant also
has access to /foo/bar.
To address this, future work could investigate the application
of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to provide a mecha-
nism for remote attestation of privilege in an access controlled
protocol without divulging anything more than necessary.
Aside from the provisioning of proving and verification key
materials for PKI identities with periods of validity, particular
challenges in using frameworks such as zk-SNARK [15] (zero-
knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge)
with applications using DDS networks is maintaining real time
performance in terms of security overhead and scalability;
that is, limiting the upper bound of computation time for
verification, conserving bandwidth for sending larger proofs
over the wire, and limited input sizes when transforming
permission sets into a boolean circuit.
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X. APPENDIX
Algorithm 1 DDS Security v1.0 Default Access Control Logic
1: procedure EVALUATE(permissions, subject)
2: for grant in permissions do
3: match← grant.subject name.match(subject)
4: valid← grant.validity(current date time)
5: if match and valid then
6: qualifier ← CHECKRULES(rules, subject)
7: if qualifier is None then
8: return grant.default
9: else
10: return qualifier
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: return ERROR
15: end procedure
16: function CHECKRULES(rules, subject)
17: for rule in rules do
18: domain← subject.domain in rule.domainSet
19: criteria← rule.get(subject.action.type)
20: . Action types: publish, subscribe, relay
21: match← CHECKCRITERIA(criteria, subject)
22: if domain and match then
23: return rules.qualifier
24: . Qualifier types: ALLOW,DENY
25: end if
26: end for
27: return None
28: end function
29: function CHECKCRITERIA(criteria, subject)
30: for criterion, i in criteria.criterions do
31: matches[i]← any (criterion.match(subject))
32: . Criterion types: topics, partitions, tags
33: end for
34: return all (matches)
35: end function
36: function MATCH(publisher, subscriber)
37: isMatched← publisher.action = PUBLISH and
38: subscriber.action = SUBSCRIBE and
39: publisher.topic = subscriber.topic and
40: publisher.partition = subscriber.partition and
41: publisher.datatag = subscriber.datatag
42: return isMatched
43: end function
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dds>
  <permissions>
    <grant name="/talker">
      <subject_name>CN=/talker</subject_name>
      <validity>
        <not_before>2013-10-26T00:00:00</not_before>
        <not_after>2018-10-26T22:45:30</not_after>
      </validity>
      <allow_rule> <!-- multi and/or <deny_rule> -->
        <domains>
          <id_range> <!-- multi and/or <id> -->
            <min>10</min>
            <max>42</max>
          </id_range>
        </domains>
        <publish> <!-- multi and/or pub/sub -->
          <partitions> <!-- multi and/or <tags> -->
            <partition>food</partition>
          </partitions>
          <topics>
            <topic>foo/bar/pudding</topic>
            <topic>foo/bar/test</topic>
            <topic>foo/bar/*</topic>
          </topics>
        </publish>
      </allow_rule>
      <default>DENY</default> <!-- or >ALLOW< -->
    </grant>
  </permissions>
</dds> (a) Talker Permissions
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dds>
  <permissions>
    <grant name="/listener">
      <subject_name>CN=/listener</subject_name>
      <validity>
        <not_before>2014-10-26T00:00:00</not_before>
        <not_after>2019-10-26T22:45:30</not_after>
      </validity>
      <allow_rule> <!-- multi and/or <deny_rule> -->
        <domains>
          <id_range> <!-- multi and/or <id> -->
            <min>20</min>
            <max>50</max>
          </id_range>
        </domains>
        <subscribe> <!-- multi and/or pub/sub -->
          <partitions> <!-- multi and/or <tags> -->
            <partition>food</partition>
            <partition>spam/*</partition>
          </partitions>
          <topics>
            <topic>foo/bar/pudding</topic>
            <topic>foo/baz/test</topic>
          </topics>
        </subscribe>
      </allow_rule>
      <default>DENY</default> <!-- or >ALLOW< -->
    </grant>
  </permissions>
</dds> (b) Listener Permissions
Fig. 7: Highlighted diff between two Secure DDS permission.xml files depicting degrees of overlapping capabilities.
